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Abstract 
Although previous research has focused on competence and sociability as the characteristics 
most important to positive group evaluation, we suggest that morality is more important. 
Studies with pre-existing and experimentally-created in-groups showed a set of positive traits 
to constitute distinct factors of morality, competence, and sociability. When asked directly, 
Study 1 participants reported that their in-group’s morality was more important than its 
competence or sociability. An unobtrusive Factor Analytic method also showed morality to 
be a more important explanation of positive in-group evaluation than competence or 
sociability. Experimental manipulations of morality and competence (Study 4) and morality 
and sociability (Study 5), showed that only in-group morality affected aspects of the group-
level self-concept related to positive evaluation (i.e., pride in, and distancing from, the in-
group). Consistent with this, identification with experimentally-created (Study 2b) and pre-
existing (Studies 4 and 5) in-groups predicted the ascription of morality to the in-group, but 
not competence or sociability.
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Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in the positive 
evaluation of in-groups 
Both Western and Eastern metaphysics specify the characteristics that constitute 
people’s greatest virtues and vices (for discussions, see MacIntyre, 1984; Nietzsche, 
1887/1967; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). For example, Aristotle listed 14 
human virtues in his Ethics, including “righteous indignation,” “the just,” “sincerity,” 
“wisdom” and “friendliness” (Robinson, 1989). According to Aristotle, people who display 
these characteristics should be evaluated positively, as good and virtuous people. 
Contemporary research on the characteristics used to positively evaluate groups has tended to 
focus on two of the virtues mentioned by Aristotle -- competence (i.e., wisdom) and 
sociability (i.e., friendliness). This emphasis of competence and sociability has meant that 
little attention has been given to the characteristic that Aristotle, and most metaphysics, 
considers most important to the evaluation of human virtue – morality (see MacIntyre, 1984; 
Nietzsche, 1887/1967). 
Metaphysics is not the only branch of thought that considers morality the most 
important of virtues. De Waal’s (1996) comparative studies of primates have led him to argue 
that the complex social interaction required for survival within the highly interdependent 
groups in which humans (as well as Chimpanzees and Bonobos) live requires that individual 
behavior be guided by a sense of morality. In quite different work, Schwartz (1992) has 
shown that people across the world consider moral values among the most important 
“guiding principles” in their lives. Thus, this paper extends previous work on the role of 
competence and sociability in individuals’ positive evaluation of in-groups by also examining 
the role of morality. In five studies, we use different methods to compare the importance of 
morality, competence, and sociability in the positive evaluation of pre-existing (Studies 1, 3, 
4 and 5) and experimentally created (Studies 2a and 2b) in-groups. 
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The Basis of Positive Evaluation 
 A wide variety of research has shown that the single traits people ascribe to 
themselves and others (e.g., intelligent, skilled, competent) tend to cluster together to 
describe a specific human characteristic (i.e., competence; Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957; White, 1980; Williams & Best, 1982). In turn, these 
characteristics (e.g., competence, sociability, morality, strength, prestige) tend to fall along 
two more general dimensions of positive evaluation: power (i.e., agency, dominance, 
dynamism) and benevolence (i.e., communion, nurturance, favorability; for reviews, see 
Leach, 2006; Osgood, 1971; White, 1980; Williams & Best, 1982).1 For example, Rosenberg, 
Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968) showed that the single personality traits ascribed to 
individuals tended to coalesce into specific clusters indicating the more abstract human 
characteristics of competence (i.e., “skillful,” “industrious,” “intelligent”), sociability (i.e., 
“good-natured,” “happy,” “warm,” “sociable”), and morality (i.e., “honest,” “sincere”), 
among others. The competence cluster fell along one, more general, dimension described as 
“intellectual goodness,” whereas the sociability and morality clusters fell along a second, 
more general, dimension described as “social goodness.” 
Competence and Sociability 
 Although a wide variety of human characteristics may be used to evaluate groups 
(Brewer & Campbell, 1979; Osgood et al., 1957; Williams & Best, 1982; for a review, see 
Leach, 2006), most contemporary research tends to examine only competence and sociability. 
For example, a wide variety of research shows that groups that are more successful than 
others tend to be ascribed high competence (e.g., Conway et al., 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 
1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et al., 2005; Poppe & Linssen, 1999; Ridgeway, Boyle, 
Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998). In contrast, groups that are less successful tend to be ascribed 
moderate sociability. Theories of social role (Eagly & Steffen, 1984), status-expectation 
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(Ridgeway et al., 1998), interdependence (e.g., Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999), 
social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), all 
suggest that this differential ascription of characteristics serves to legitimate differential 
success by providing each group a distinct basis of positive evaluation (see also Fiske et al., 
2002). More specifically, the functionalist perspective at the heart of these theories suggests 
that competence and sociability enable more and less successful groups to evaluate 
themselves positively if they characterize themselves in a way that legitimates their level of 
success. It is argued that a more successful in-group can feel good about itself because of its 
competence whereas a less successful in-group can feel good about itself because of its 
sociability.  
 Despite the popularity of the functionalist perspective, few studies have directly asked 
people how important competence and sociability are for their in-groups (as we do in Study 
1). More critically, little work has empirically examined the importance of competence and 
sociability in individuals’ positive evaluation of their in-groups. It has simply been presumed 
that those characteristics that individuals most ascribe to their in-group are most important to 
individuals’ positive evaluation of the in-group and to individuals’ (group-level) self-concept. 
However, the degree to which traits are ascribed to an in-group may be influenced by a 
number of contextual concerns that have little to do with the psychological importance these 
traits have for in-group membership (e.g., Judd et al., 2005; van Knippenberg, 1978). For 
example, success at a task may lead individuals to ascribe more competence to their in-group 
without necessarily making competence more important to the positive evaluation of the in-
group (for a discussion, see Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). Thus, rather than assuming that 
the degree to which characteristics are ascribed to an in-group is an indication of their 
importance, the present studies use both direct and unobtrusive methods to actually assess the 
importance of competence and sociability in individuals’ positive evaluation of their in-
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group. 
 As the vast majority of research on the ascription of characteristics to groups has not 
examined morality, we know very little about its importance to positive evaluation. In 
addition, the importance of morality is unclear because the few studies that aimed to address 
morality conflated it with other characteristics, such as dominance (Phallet and Poppe, 1997) 
or sociability (Fiske et al., 2002; Jost & Kay, 2005; see also Wojciszke, 1994).2 However, a 
group may be moral (i.e., honest and trustworthy) without necessarily being sociable (i.e., 
warm and friendly), and vice versa. For example, a moral in-group may be honest about an 
out-group’s failings, even where this means that they are being less warm and friendly toward 
the out-group. And, a sociable in-group may be warm and friendly in a disingenuous (and 
thus immoral) attempt to win friends and influence people. Although morality and sociability 
can be seen as falling along the same general dimension of evaluation (i.e., benevolence), 
they are conceptually distinct characteristics. Indeed, research at the individual level shows 
people to treat personality traits related to morality as distinct from traits related to sociability 
(e.g., Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Rosenberg et al, 1968; White, 1980). There is no reason 
this should not also be the case at the group level. Thus, in several studies, we establish the 
validity of distinct, trait-based, measures of in-group morality, competence, and sociability. If 
morality is a distinct in-group characteristic, it should play a distinct role in the positive 
evaluation of in-groups. 
The Importance of Morality 
The social identity tradition assumes that any characteristic ascribed to an in-group 
can provide a basis for positive evaluation (see Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Thus, at a theoretical level, the social identity 
tradition allows for morality to be the most important characteristic in the positive evaluation 
of in-groups. However, most empirical work within the social identity tradition has examined 
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competence as the basis of positive in-group evaluation (for reviews, see Bettencourt, Dorr, 
Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Spears et al., 2001). Thus, research in the social 
identity tradition tends to share the functionalist approach in other work on competence and 
sociability in group evaluation. More specifically, in the social identity tradition, the sense of 
competence thought to follow from an in-group’s intellectual or economic success is 
presumed to enable both the positive evaluation of the in-group (i.e., “in-group favoritism”) 
and the negative evaluation of a less successful out-group (i.e., “out-group derogation”). As 
such, in-group competence is widely considered “status-defining” – the basis of a status 
distinction that favors the in-group over an out-group (for reviews, see Bettencourt et al., 
2001; Spears et al., 2001). 
Given that competence is presumed to be the most important basis of positive in-
group evaluation, the social identity tradition suggests that in-groups lacking in competence 
must use “alternative” characteristics to evaluate themselves (Lemaine, 1974). For example, 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued that low status in-groups may evaluate themselves positively 
by emphasizing their artistry, rather than their (low) competence. In this way, low status 
groups are expected to exercise “social creativity” to replace competence as a basis of their 
collective virtue. Thus, some studies in the social identity tradition have interpreted 
unsuccessful groups ascribing relatively high morality to their in-group as the use of morality 
as an “alternative” basis of positive evaluation (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; 
Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997). However, these studies did not directly ask participants how 
much importance they gave to their in-group’s morality, competence, or sociability. Neither 
did these studies actually examine the importance of in-group morality, competence, and 
sociability in the positive evaluation of the in-group. Thus, there is little evidence that 
competence is especially important to the positive evaluation of in-groups, or that morality is 
an “alternative” characteristic that only becomes important when it is difficult to positively 
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evaluate the in-group based on its competence. Despite the theoretical possibility in the social 
identity tradition that morality can be most important to positive in-group evaluation, most 
research is based on the presumption that competence is most important. 
Although we undertook the present studies because there has been little examination 
of the importance of in-group morality, some work is broadly consistent with the notion that 
morality is of special importance to people. For example, at the individual level, Rodriguez 
Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer (2002) found university students in Spain and the 
Netherlands to both show a very strong belief that being dishonest and untrustworthy would 
make them feel bad about themselves. Consistent with this, Schwartz and colleague’s series 
of cross-national studies shows individuals to consider moral values among the most 
important “guiding principle” in their lives (for a review, see Schwartz, 1992). Even the most 
success-oriented sample, university students in the United States, rated values related to 
morality as more important than values related to competence (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). 
At the group level, De Waal’s (1996) comparative studies of primate behavior led him 
to argue that a sense of morality is essential to the group life of primates such as humans. 
Without a sense of morality in the group, he argued, it would be difficult for members to 
coordinate their behavior in ways that maximize benefits for themselves and the group as a 
whole. Consistent with this, recent models of procedural justice suggest that the perceived 
“trustworthiness” of an in-group is a major determinant of individuals’ positive evaluation of 
the group and their willingness to cooperate with other members (for reviews, see Skitka, 
2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003). This may be why Campbell and colleague’s large-scale, multi-
method studies of ethnocentrism throughout the world found morality (i.e., honesty, 
trustworthiness) to be central to how individuals evaluated their ethnic in-group relative to 
out-groups (Brewer & Campbell, 1979; Levine & Campbell, 1972). Thus, there appears to be 
good reason to expect that morality is of central importance to the positive evaluation of in-
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groups and to the group-level self-concept. 
Although morality has been given little place in contemporary Western psychology, 
the broader tradition of Western thought has long viewed morality as the most important of 
human virtues (for discussions, see MacIntyre, 1984; Nietzsche, 1887/1967; Shweder et al., 
1997). The classical view, perhaps best represented by Aristotle’s Ethics, sees morality as the 
most important basis upon which people should evaluate themselves, and others, positively 
(MacIntyre, 1984). Indeed, Aristotle argued that all other virtues were, to some degree, 
dependent on morality. According to Aristotle, competence and sociability are only virtuous 
if they are expressed through a moral character that makes them sincere and trustworthy 
(MacIntyre, 1984). This suggests that morality is most important to positive self-evaluation 
because determines the meaning of every other human characteristic (see Osgood et al., 
1957). For example, a political party that is competent in administration or sociable in 
campaigning is most assured of its goodness if it is also trustworthy. Competence or 
sociability in an immoral party gives little basis for positive self-evaluation. Indeed, immoral 
competence is dangerous and immoral sociability is disingenuous (Osgood et al., 1957; 
Wojciszke, 1994). 
Overview 
No prior research of which we are aware has examined the importance of morality to 
individuals’ positive evaluation of their in-group. Although a great deal of work has 
examined the mean-level ascription of competence and sociability to groups, this work has 
tended to either exclude morality or to assume that the importance of a characteristic is 
indicated by the degree to which it is ascribed to a group. Rarely has the actual importance of 
morality, competence, and sociability to the positive evaluation of in-groups been examined. 
In an important first step, Studies 1 and 2 use Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to 
validate trait measures of morality, sociability, and competence as distinct in-group 
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characteristics. Study 1 directly asks individuals to explicitly indicate whether morality, 
competence, or sociability is the characteristic most important for their in-group to possess. 
To complement this approach, Studies 1-3 use Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to 
unobtrusively examine the importance of morality, competence, and sociability in 
participant’s positive evaluation of their in-groups. EFA shows which of the three 
characteristics explains the most variance common to the positive traits ascribed to the in-
group. In Study 3, we also examine relative group success as a potential moderator of the 
importance of morality, competence, and sociability to in-group evaluation. If morality is 
most important, it should remain so irrespective of the in-group’s success relative to an out-
group. In addition, morality should not be most important to the positive evaluation of an out-
group. Thus, we also examine the importance of morality, competence, and sociability to out-
group evaluation. 
Studies 4 and 5 take an experimental approach. Here we manipulate the morality, 
competence, and sociability of a pre-existing in-group to examine effects on two aspects of 
the group-level self-concept related to positive evaluation: group pride and perceived group 
variability. If morality is most important to individual’s positive evaluation of their in-group, 
then high morality should lead to greater group pride. Conversely, low morality should lead 
individuals to distance themselves from the in-group. Study 4 compares the effects of in-
group morality and competence whereas Study 5 compares the effects of in-group morality 
and sociability. 
To offer yet another approach of examining the importance of in-group morality, 
competence, and sociability, Studies 2b, 4 and 5 assess participants’ identification with their 
in-group. If morality is central to the group-level self-concept, then in-group identification 
should lead individuals to ascribe morality to their in-group. In contrast, in-group 
identification should be less predictive of ascriptions of competence or sociability to the in-
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group. 
Study 1 
We use this study to offer evidence of the construct validity of trait measures of in-
group morality, competence, and sociability. First, we used CFA to examine the latent 
structure of the positive traits designed to indicate these three group characteristics. Second, 
we included a number of traits to indicate the general positive valence (“virtue”, “value”, 
“worth”) of the in-group. By correlating this measure of valence to the three in-group 
characteristics, we aimed to establish that morality, competence and sociability are equally 
positive characteristics. Third, we correlated each of the three group characteristics to a set of 
closely related traits. By showing that in-group morality, competence, and sociability are only 
correlated to those traits that are conceptually similar we aimed to demonstrate the 
convergent and divergent validity of the three group characteristics. As we conceptualize in-
group morality as an in-group’s collective “correctness,” we expect morality to be most 
associated with the evaluation of the in-group as “good” and “correct,” rather than “bad” and 
“wrong” (see Osgood et al., 1957). As suggested by Eagly and Steffen (1984), Conway et al. 
(1987), and Poppe and Linnsen (1999), we expect in-group competence to be most associated 
with achievement (e.g., “successful,” “prestigious”). And, based in Rosenberg et al. (1968) 
and Osgood et al. (1957), we expected in-group sociability to be most associated with 
communality (e.g., “kind,” “helpful”). 
 This study uses both a direct and an unobtrusive method to assess the importance of 
in-group morality, competence, and sociability. In a direct method, we ask participants to 
explicitly indicate how important it is for their in-group to possess traits indicating morality, 
competence, and sociability. If morality is as important as we suggest, then individuals 
should recognize it as such. We also used the unobtrusive method of EFA to assess the 
importance given morality, competence, and sociability in the positive evaluation of the in-
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group. EFA is based on the common factor model (for discussions, see Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacAllum, & Strahan, 1999; Tabachnich & Fidell, 1996). As such, EFA examines the 
variance that the positive in-group traits have in common with each other in search of factors 
that account for the covariance between these traits. Each factor explains a proportion of the 
common variance in the positive traits (see Tabachnich & Fidell, 1996). Thus, we use EFA to 
examine to what degree morality, competence, and sociability actually explain the common 
variance of participants’ positive evaluation of their in-group. Famously, Osgood et al. (1957) 
used a similar approach to show that favorability tended to be a more important factor than 
strength and activity in the evaluation of people and other entities. Here, we expect that 
morality explains more of the common variance in positive in-group evaluation than 
competence or sociability. EFA serves as an unobtrusive method of examining the 
importance of morality, competence, and sociability in positive in-group evaluation because 
(1) it does not rely on the mean level at which traits are ascribed to the in-group, and (2) it 
does not require us to directly ask individuals to explicitly state the importance they give to 
in-group traits. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Eighty-four male and female students at Leiden University in the Netherlands 
received partial course credit for their participation (Mage = 21, SD = 4.29). Participants were 
brought into a “lab” to complete a multi-part questionnaire. In the first part of the 
questionnaire, we asked participants to indicate how important it was for the groups to which 
they belonged to possess a list of traits. 
Measures 
Drawing on the literature summarized above, and the more extensive review by Leach 
(2006), we provided participants with nine traits designed to indicate group morality, 
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competence, and sociability. These traits were interspersed with the other traits described 
below. Responses were given on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 (not very important) and 
7 (very important). In an improvement on previous research at the group level, morality (α = 
.80) was assessed with the traits “honest,” “sincere,” and “trustworthy” (see also Anderson & 
Sedikides, 1991; Osgood et al., 1957; Rosenberg et al., 1968). As in a good deal of stereotype 
research, sociability was assessed with the traits “likeable,” “warm,” and “friendly” (α = .69) 
whereas competence was assessed with the traits “competent,” “intelligent,” and “skilled” (α 
= .86). 
Based on Leach (2006), we used 16 other traits to assess valence (virtuous, valuable, 
constructive, worthless[reversed], α = .57) as well as correctness (good, right, bad[reversed], 
wrong[reversed], α = .66); communality (benevolent, kind, helpful, safe, α = .69); and 
achievement (superior, successful, prestigious, ambitious, α = .79). These characteristics 
were used to validate our measures of in-group morality, competence, and sociability. 
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
As a first step, we examined our suggestion that morality, competence, and sociability 
are distinct in-group characteristics. Thus, we submitted the nine items assessing participant’s 
explicit statements of the importance of these in-group characteristics to a CFA using 
maximum likelihood estimation. Each item was specified to indicate only its hypothesized 
factor and no errors were allowed to correlate. However, the three hypothesized latent factors 
of morality, competence, and sociability were allowed to correlate with each other. 
The hypothesized three-factor measurement model fit the data well (for a review of 
the indices used below, see Hu & Bentler, 1999). The model adequately reproduced the 
observed covariance matrix, as the Chi-square statistic was small and non-reliable, χ2 (24) = 
28.59, p = .24. However, this is not surprising given the small sample size. More telling is 
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that the χ2/df ratio (= 1.19) fell below 2.5. Good model fit was also suggested by a wide 
variety of fit (NNFI = .975, CFI = .983, IFI = 984, GFI = .940) and residual (SRMR = .064, 
RMSEA = .048) indices. In addition, the factor loadings for morality (.51-.90), competence 
(.76-.93), and sociability (.60-.77) were all sizeable and statistically reliable (all p < .05). The 
inter-correlations between factors were low (i.e., .02, .29, .30). 
Further analysis showed the hypothesized three-factor measurement model to fit 
better than more parsimonious alternatives. Thus, a two-factor model that specified a 
competence factor and a combined morality-sociability factor fit less well than the three-
factor model, Δχ2 (2) = 32.89, p < .005. This two-factor model also fit poorly in an absolute 
sense: NNFI = .821, CFI = .871, IFI = .875, GFI = .873 and SRMR = .107, RMSEA = .127. 
In addition, a two-factor model that specified a morality factor and a combined competence-
sociability factor fit less well than the three-factor model, Δχ2 (2) = 113.49, p < .005. This 
model also fit poorly in an absolute sense: NNFI = .414, CFI = .577, IFI = .592, GFI = .739 
and SRMR = .169, RMSEA = .231. Lastly, a one-factor model of general positive in-group 
evaluation fit less well than the hypothesized three-factor model, Δχ2 (3) = 146.65, p < .005. 
This one-factor model also fit poorly in an absolute sense: NNFI = .279, CFI = .459, IFI = 
.477, GFI = .695 and SRMR = .189, RMSEA = .256. 
Construct Validity 
 To further examine the construct validity of our measures of in-group morality, 
competence, and sociability, we computed (zero-order and partial) correlations between these 
characteristics and the four others we included. Results are shown in Table 1. Consistent with 
our conceptualization of morality, competence, and sociability as equally positive 
characteristics, they were similarly correlated to the individual items as well as the composite 
scale of valence. As expected, in-group morality was uniquely correlated with correctness 
whereas in-group competence was uniquely correlated with achievement. Also as expected, 
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in-group sociability was uniquely correlated with communality. 
The Importance of Morality, Competence, and Sociability 
 We examined the importance of morality, competence, and sociability with two 
different methods. To unobtrusively examine the importance of the morality, competence, 
and sociability factors, we submitted the nine traits to a Principal-Axis FA (with maximum 
likelihood estimation and Oblimin rotation). As oblique rotation tends to equalize the 
common variance explained by each factor, we report the percent of variance each factor 
explains upon initial extraction (see Tabachnich & Fidell, 1996). Examination of the common 
variance each factor explained upon initial extraction showed morality to be most important 
(i.e., 32.98%). Competence explained 15.64% of the common variance whereas sociability 
explained 6.95%. This three-factor solution fit the data well -- χ2 (12) = 6.13, p = .91, χ2/df = 
.511, and accounted for a majority of the common variance in the items (55.57%). 
 We also used a direct method to examine the importance participants explicitly gave 
to the morality, competence, and sociability of their in-groups. We asked participants to 
indicate the importance of each group trait in an absolute fashion. Paired samples t-tests 
showed that participants viewed the traits constituting morality (M = 6.39, SD = .65) as more 
important for their in-group than competence (M = 5.10, SD = .99), t (84) = 11.28, p < .001, d 
= 1.22, or sociability (M = 6.11, SD = .69), t (84) = 3.19, p = .002, d = .35. In addition, in-
group competence was deemed less important than sociability, t (84) = 7.86, p < .001, d = 
.85. 
Discussion 
 This study offered initial support for our suggestion that morality, competence, and 
sociability are distinct in-group characteristics. We used CFA to show that morality, 
competence, and sociability factors account well for the associations between a set of positive 
traits designed to indicate these characteristics. More parsimonious alternatives did not 
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account for the latent structure in the in-group traits as well as these three distinct factors, 
which were only modestly correlated. The validity of these morality, competence, and 
sociability factors was further suggested by their correlations with other in-group traits. 
Morality was uniquely associated with correctness, competence was uniquely associated with 
achievement, and sociability was uniquely associated with communality. However, in-group 
morality, competence, and sociability, were equally positive in valence.  
 This study used two different approaches to show that in-group morality is more 
important to individuals than is competence or sociability. When individuals were directly 
asked about the importance of traits indicating morality, competence, and sociability, they 
reported that morality traits were the most important for their in-groups to possess. In contrast 
to what is suggested by previous theory, competence was deemed the least important 
characteristic for participant’s in-groups to possess. This direct method of asking participants 
to report the importance of morality, competence, and sociability was complemented by an 
unobtrusive approach. EFA showed the morality factor to explain twice the common variance 
explained by competence and over four times the common variance explained by sociability. 
Thus, morality was the characteristic most important to the participants’ positive evaluation 
of their in-groups. 
 Although a promising first step, Study 1 did not force participants to focus on one 
specific in-group. Indeed, participants were likely to have thought of quite different in-groups 
when indicating the importance of morality, competence, and sociability. Thus, Studies 2a 
and 2b sought to corroborate and extend the present results by assigning participants to an 
experimentally-created in-group with which participants had no prior experience. This 
allowed us a greater degree of methodological control by having participants judge a single 
in-group that we represented in the same way to all participants. In addition, Studies 2a and 
2b sought to extend Study 1 by having participants ascribe traits indicating morality, 
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competence, and sociability to the experimentally-created in-group. As this kind of trait 
ascription is typical of previous studies of group competence and sociability, Studies 2a and 
2b aimed to be more comparable to previous work. However, unlike previous work, we 
actually gauge the importance of morality, competence, and sociability in the positive 
evaluation of experimentally-created in-groups. As in Study 1, we utilize the unobtrusive 
method of EFA to accomplish this. 
Study 2 
Two, highly similar, studies were designed to pursue three main aims. First, we use 
CFA to show that the nine traits we designed to indicate group morality, sociability, and 
competence constitute three distinct factors. Unlike Study 1, these studies ask participants to 
ascribe positive traits to an experimentally created in-group with which they had no prior 
experience. Second, we use the unobtrusive method of EFA to examine the actual importance 
of the morality, sociability, and competence factors in explaining the variance common to the 
positive traits ascribed to the in-group. As in Study 1, we expect morality to be more 
important than competence or sociability to the positive evaluation of the in-group. 
The third aim of Study 2 is to provide yet another method for assessing the 
importance of morality, competence, and sociability to in-group membership. Thus, we 
assess the degree to which identification with an in-group predicts the degree to which 
individuals ascribe morality, competence, and sociability to this in-group. As group 
identification is strongly associated with the positive evaluation of the in-group, and with the 
incorporation of the in-group into the self-concept (e.g., Leach et al., 2006; for reviews, see 
Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999), we expect in-group 
identification to be an especially good predictor of participant’s ascription of morality to their 
in-group. In-group identification should be less predictive of the ascription of competence or 
sociability to the in-group, as these characteristics should be less important to positive in-
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group evaluation and the group-level self-concept. With Study 2b we also aim to further 
corroborate the results of Studies 1 and 2a by working in a different national context. 
Method 
Participants 
Study 2a. Participants were 105 (72 women, 33 men) psychology students at the 
University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands (Mage = 21, SD = 4.29). They participated for 
course credit. 
Study 2b. Participants were 158 (119 women, 39 men) students at the University of 
Sussex in England (Mage = 21, SD = 4.49). They participated for course credit or payment (of 
5 British pounds). 
Procedure 
Both studies were embedded within experiments focused on social comparison within 
an experimentally created in-group (i.e., Vliek, Leach, & Spears, 2006). Participants were 
brought to a classroom and seated in separate cubicles for a computer-administered study. 
The computer introduced the study as an “exploration into different kinds of perception.” 
Participants were told that research had revealed that people could be characterized as having 
one of two perceptual styles: “global” and “detailed.” The ostensible goal of the experiment 
was to discover whether these styles of visual perception mattered for performance on the 
kind of perception-based tasks often used to measure intelligence. Admittedly, this oft-used 
cover story is more relevant to in-group competence than morality or sociability. Never the 
less, we still expected morality to be most important to participants’ positive evaluation of the 
in-group. 
 In order to determine their perceptual style, participants completed several trials of 
two different tasks: a dot-estimation task and a dice-recognition task. Upon completion, the 
computer ostensibly calculated the participants’ score on the tasks. Presumably based on this 
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score, the computer categorized each participant as a “detailed perceiver.” Participants were 
then presented with a list of positive traits and asked to indicate to what degree each 
characterized detailed perceivers. Responses were given on a seven-point scale, anchored by 
1 (not all) and 7 (very much). The traits, including the nine designed to indicate morality, 
competence, and sociability, were presented in a random order. In Study 2b, participant’s 
group identification was measured immediately after in-group categorization. 
Measures 
In Study 2a, the scales of morality (α = .79; M = 4.85, SD = .89), sociability (α = .76; 
M = 4.57, SD = .89), and competence (α = .72; M = 5.35, SD = .72) used in Study 1 all 
proved reliable. The scales of in-group morality (α = .90; M = 4.81, SD = .96) competence (α 
= .88; M = 5.15, SD = .91), and sociability (α = .85; M = 4.57, SD = .86) also proved reliable 
in Study 2b. 
 Using a seven-point Likert-type response scale, Study 2b participants were asked to 
what degree they identified as a “detailed perceiver” with 4 items (α = .75) from the scale 
developed by Ellemers et al. (1999). Thus, we asked participants to what degree they 
“identified with” detailed perceivers, whether they were “glad to be categorized as a detailed 
perceiver,” whether they felt “strong ties” with detailed perceivers, and whether they “saw 
themselves as” a detailed perceiver. 
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The nine traits designed to indicate in-group morality, competence, and sociability 
were submitted to a Confirmatory Factor Analysis with maximum likelihood estimation 
parallel to that of Study 1. As Studies 2a and 2b were highly similar in method, we examined 
the combined data in a multi-group analysis. In essence, this approach estimated one 
measurement model that constrained each item’s loading on its hypothesized factor to be 
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equal across the two studies. As in Study 1, items were specified as loading on only on factor 
and no errors were allowed to correlate. However, the three latent factors corresponding to 
morality, competence, and sociability were allowed to correlate. 
The three-factor model fit the data well, χ2 (54) = 110.88, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.05. This 
was also shown in a variety of fit (NNFI = .963, CFI = .972, IFI = .972, GFI = .919) and 
residual (SRMR = .042, RMSEA = .064) indices. A model specifying a combined morality-
sociability factor and a competence factor, fit less well than the hypothesized model, Δχ2 (4) 
= 176.76, p < .001. This alternative model also fit poorly in an absolute sense, as shown in a 
variety of fit (NNFI = .860, CFI = .887, IFI = .888, GFI = .789) and residual (SRMR = .072, 
RMSEA = .123) indices. 
The Importance of Morality, Competence, and Sociability 
 As in Study 1, we used an EFA to unobtrusively examine the importance of morality, 
competence, and sociability in the positive traits ascribed to participant’s in-group. In Study 
2a, the three-factor solution fit the data well, χ2 (12) = 19.79, p = .07, χ2/df = 1.65, and 
accounted for a majority of the common variance (58%). As expected, morality was the first 
factor extracted before rotation. Thus, group morality explained the greatest amount of the 
common variance in the positive traits participant’s ascribed to their in-group (i.e., 33.34%). 
Sociability was the second factor extracted (explaining 15.45% of the common variance) and 
competence was the third factor extracted (explaining 9.62% of the common variance). 
 In Study 2b, the three-factor solution fit the data satisfactorily, χ2 (12) = 28.74, p = 
.004, χ2/df = 2.40, and accounted for a majority of the common variance (i.e., 72.46%). 
Morality was the first factor extracted before rotation and thus explained the greatest amount 
of the common variance (i.e., 55.29%). Competence (8.61%) and sociability (8.57%). 
explained near equal amounts of variance. 
In-group Identification 
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 In Study 2b, we performed a MANOVA, with in-group identification as a continuous 
predictor of participants’ ascription of morality, competence, and sociability to their in-group. 
We also included gender as a categorical predictor. As gender had no main or interaction 
effects (both p > .93, both partial η2 < .003) it is not discussed further. 
In-group identification had a multivariate effect on the ascription of the three 
characteristics to the in-group, F (3, 152) = 8.98, p < .001, partial η2 = .15. At the univariate 
level, in-group identification predicted the ascription of competence -- F (1, 158) = 15.64, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .09, as well as sociability -- F (1, 158) = 17.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .10. 
However, as predicted, in-group identification had the largest effect on participants ascription 
of morality to their in-group -- F (1, 158) = 23.02, p < .001, partial η2 = .13. Analysis of 
partial correlations, accounting for all three group characteristics, showed in-group 
identification to uniquely predict in-group morality, partial r = .19, p = .02. However, partial 
correlations revealed that in-group identification did not uniquely predict in-group sociability 
(r = .12, p = .15) or competence (r = .06, p = .43). 
Discussion 
Studies 2a and 2b categorized participants as members of a quasi-minimal in-group. 
We then asked them to indicate to what degree a list of positive traits characterized this in-
group. As participants had no pre-conceived notion of this in-group or its characteristics, they 
were free to imbue the in-group with whichever traits they preferred. A CFA showed these 
traits to constitute distinct factors of morality, sociability, and competence. We used the 
unobtrusive method of EFA to show that the morality factor explained much more of the 
common variance in these positive traits than did competence or sociability. In these two 
ways, Studies 2a and 2b corroborate Study 1. That morality is the most important factor in 
the positive evaluation of the in-groups in these two studies is all the more impressive given 
that in-group membership was defined in terms of a perceptual style presumably linked to 
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intelligence. Clearly the competence-oriented context of this study, and participants’ status as 
students, made morality fairly irrelevant to the in-group membership examined. Thus, Study 
2 may be considered a conservative test of our hypotheses. 
Additionally, Study 2b showed that the more individuals identified with the in-group 
to which they were assigned, the more they ascribed morality to this in-group. Indeed, in-
group identification uniquely predicted in-group morality; In-group identification did not 
uniquely predict in-group competence or sociability. Thus, identification with an 
experimentally created in-group determined positive evaluation of this in-group only in terms 
of its morality. Despite these encouraging results, we thought it important to show that our 
hypotheses also apply to the ascription of traits to a real, pre-existing in-group. And, because 
much previous work suggests that relative group success affects the importance given to 
morality, competence, and sociability in the positive evaluation of in-groups, we thought it 
important to manipulate relative group success. These concerns guided the design of Study 3. 
Study 3 
 As outlined in the introduction, a functionalist perspective suggests that competence 
should be the characteristic most important to the positive evaluation of an in-group that is 
more successful than an out-group. In addition, a functionalist perspective suggests that either 
sociability or morality should be the characteristic most important to the positive evaluation 
of a less successful in-group, as competence is presumed unavailable as a basis of positive 
evaluation. However, as stated in the introduction, little previous work has examined the 
actual importance of morality, competence, and sociability in the positive evaluation of more 
or less successful in-groups. Thus, as shown in Studies 1 and 2, we expect that where in-
group morality is examined as a characteristic distinct from competence and sociability, 
morality should be most important to the positive evaluation of an in-group. In contrast to 
work that presumes that morality is an alternative way of positively evaluating a less 
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successful in-group, we expect that morality will be most important to the positive evaluation 
of the in-group irrespective of the in-group’s success relative to an out-group. 
Study 3 also aimed to extend the previous two by having individuals ascribe positive 
traits to an out-group (relative to which the in-group was more or less successful). If morality 
is most important to the positive evaluation of in-groups because morality is central to the 
group-level self-concept, then morality must necessarily be less important in the positive 
evaluation of out-groups (as they are not part of the self). Thus, we suggest that competence 
and sociability should be more important than morality in the positive evaluation of out-
groups. Our reasoning is consistent with what is implied in some research on group 
stereotypes. Studies that have utilized measures of sociability free of morality suggest that 
sociability is most important to the positive evaluation of less successful out-groups (e.g., 
Conway et al., 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Judd et al., 2005). When an out-group is more 
successful than the in-group, competence appears to be more central to the positive 
evaluation of the out-group (e.g., Conway et al., 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 
2002; Poppe & Linnsen, 1999; Ridgeway et al., 1998). However, these studies did not 
examine the actual importance of competence or sociability in the positive evaluation of more 
or less successful out-groups as we do here. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 One-hundred and twenty male and female students at Leiden University in the 
Netherlands received partial course credit for their participation. As in numerous studies of 
in-group bias, we manipulated relative in-group success by providing participants with false 
feedback about students at their university. Ostensibly on the basis of their reputation among 
employers, the cover page of the questionnaire reported that students at participants’ 
university had better (or worse) “general ability,” “social skills,” “international orientation,” 
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and “communication skills,” than students at a relevant nearby university (i.e., the University 
of Amsterdam). This manipulation was designed to provide feedback about the in-group’s 
general success by referring to a number of behavioral domains relevant to student’s future 
career prospects. We included information regarding these different domains so that the in-
group’s relative success would be seen in general terms, rather than in the more specific 
terms of morality, competence, or sociability. However, these domains of group performance 
appear more relevant to competence and sociability than to morality, implying a stringent test 
for our contention that morality is most important in the positive evaluation of the in-group, 
regardless of its relative success. 
Immediately after the manipulation of relative group success, participants were asked 
to indicate to what degree a list of traits characterized students at their university. Responses 
were given on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 (not all) and 7 (very much). The 9 items 
used in the preceding studies were included here to measure in-group morality (α = .86; M = 
4.76, SD = .92), competence (α = .79; M = 5.36, SD = .76), and sociability (α = .77; M = 
4.91, SD = .83). Participants were then asked to ascribe these same traits to the out-group: 
morality (α = .80; M = 4.60, SD = .73), competence (α = .82; M = 5.10, SD = .78), and 
sociability (α = .66; M = 4.69, SD = .70). 
Results 
 A series of ANOVAs with Target Group (in- vs. out-group) as a within-participant 
factor and Relative Group Success as a between participants factor, showed Target Group to 
have main effects on morality, competence, and sociability. Thus, participants showed a 
consistent pattern of in-group favoritism on all three characteristics.4 However, these results 
have little bearing on our examination of the importance of morality, competence, and 
sociability in the positive evaluation of in-group and out-group. 
In-group 
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The nine traits designed to indicate in-group morality, competence, and sociability 
were analyzed with EFA, as described in the preceding studies. The three-factor solution fit 
the data well, χ2 (12) = 16.82, p = .16, χ2/df = 1.40, and accounted for a majority of the 
common variance (63%) when the in-group was more successful than the out-group. This 
was also the case when the in-group was less successful, χ2 (12) = 17.56, p = .13, χ2/df = 1.46 
(and 65% common variance explained). The factor loadings for both conditions are shown in 
the top half of Table 2. It is worth noting that the cross-loadings on factors other than those 
the items were designed to indicate tended to be low (< .300). This is further evidence that 
morality, competence, and sociability are distinct in-group characteristics. 
As we expected, morality was the first factor initially extracted, whether the in-group 
was more or less successful than the out-group. Thus, morality explained 41.46% of the 
common variance when the in-group was more successful. Sociability explained the second 
most common variance (i.e., 12.36%) and competence explained the least (i.e., 9.33%) when 
the in-group was more successful. Morality also was the first factor initially extracted when 
the in-group was less successful, explaining 30.05% of the common variance. Competence 
explained slightly less variance (i.e., 28.42%) and sociability accounted for the least variance 
(i.e., 6.48%) when the in-group was less successful than the out-group. However, it is worth 
noting that the importance of competence in the positive evaluation of the less successful in-
group appears to be exaggerated. As shown in Table 2, the items “friendly” and “sincere” 
both have moderate loadings on the competence factor. Thus, competence is nearly as 
important as morality partly because competence in this case involves some morality and 
sociability. 
Out-group 
For the positive traits ascribed to the less successful out-group, the three-factor 
solution fit the data satisfactorily, χ2 (12) = 21.74, p = .04, χ2/df = 1.81, and accounted for a 
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majority of the common variance (58%). Sociability was the first factor extracted before 
rotation and thus it explained the most common variance (i.e., 29.59%). Morality explained 
the second most common variance (i.e., 14.74%) and competence explained the least 
common variance (i.e., 13.88%). For the positive traits ascribed to the more successful out-
group, the three-factor solution fit the data extremely well, χ2 (12) = 8.72, p = .73, χ2/df = 
.727, and accounted for a majority of the common variance (i.e., 59%). Competence was the 
first factor extracted before rotation and it explained much more of the common variance 
(i.e., 44.80%) than the two other factors (i.e., 7.87% and 6.28% respectively). 
The factor loadings for both conditions are shown in the bottom half of Table 2. It is 
worth noting that the cross-loadings on factors other than those the items were designed to 
indicate tended to be low (< .300). This is further evidence that morality, competence, and 
sociability are distinct in-group characteristics. However, it is also clear that morality and 
sociability were less distinct when ascribed to the more successful out-group. In fact, this is 
the only case in this study, or in the preceding studies, where morality and sociability had a 
moderate to high correlation (r = .61, p < .001). 
Discussion 
Regardless of whether participants’ in-group was more or less successful than a 
relevant out-group, the positive traits ascribed to the in-group fell into distinct factors of 
morality, competence, and sociability. In this way, the less specified measurement model 
examined in the EFAs reported here corroborated the better-specified model examined in the 
CFAs reported Studies 1 and 2. In further corroboration of the preceding studies, morality 
was again the characteristic that was most important to the positive evaluation of the in-
group. Morality explained the most variance in the positive traits ascribed to the in-group 
regardless of the in-group’s success relative to an out-group. That morality is the most 
important factor in the positive evaluation of the in-groups in this study is all the more 
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impressive given that we examined students’ university in-group and manipulated relative 
group success in a context largely irrelevant to morality. Indeed, the manipulation of the 
groups’ reputation among employers regarding their “general ability” and “communication 
skills” appears much more relevant to the in-group’s competence and sociability. Thus, Study 
3 constitutes a conservative test of our hypotheses. 
Study 3 also extended the preceding studies by having individuals ascribe positive 
traits to a relevant out-group that was either more or less successful than the in-group. As 
predicted, the morality ascribed to this out-group was not most important to its positive 
evaluation, irrespective of relative group success. In fact, competence was most important to 
the positive evaluation of the more successful out-group, and sociability was most important 
to the positive evaluation of the less successful out-group. Given that the functionalist 
perspective has been most often applied to the ascription of traits to out-groups of varying 
success, it is perhaps not surprising that this is where our findings are most consistent with 
the functionalist view. This confirmation of the functionalist view of competence and 
sociability in out-group evaluation makes all the more compelling our consistent finding that 
it is morality that is most important to the positive evaluation of in-groups. 
Study 4 
Together, the first three studies offer consistent support for our suggestion that 
morality (not competence or sociability) is the most important factor in individuals’ positive 
evaluation of in-groups. Never the less, in all three studies we measured in-group morality, 
competence, and sociability in one way or another. Thus, we focused on the degree to which 
individuals’ positive evaluation of their in-group is imbued with traits corresponding to 
morality, competence, and sociability. Although this kind of evidence is useful, it may be 
important to complement it with evidence that in-group morality has causal effects on 
individuals’ positive evaluation of their in-group. Thus, Studies 4 and 5 experimentally 
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manipulated the characteristics of a pre-existing in-group. This enabled us to cross different 
levels of in-group morality with competence (in Study 4), and sociability (in Study 5), in 
order to systematically compare how these characteristics causally affect individuals’ positive 
evaluation of their in-group. 
If morality is most important to the positive evaluation of in-groups, then the in-
group’s level of morality should most affect aspects of the group-level self-concept that are 
related to positive evaluation. Thus, in this study we compare the effects that (high or low) 
in-group morality and competence have on group pride and perceived group variability. 
Individuals generally take more pride in in-groups that they evaluate positively (e.g., Leach et 
al., 2006; for a review, see Ashmore et al., 2004). Therefore, individuals who belong to an in-
group high in morality should take more pride in it than individuals who belong to an in-
group low in morality. Additionally, members of an in-group high in morality should 
perceive their in-group as less variable than those who belong to an in-group low in morality. 
Perceiving a highly moral in-group as less variable allows an individual member to apply this 
characteristic, and the positive evaluation it implies, to all group members, including 
themselves (for a review, see Doosje, Spears, Ellemers, & Koomen, 1999). Conversely, when 
an in-group is low in morality, individuals should perceive the in-group as more variable, in 
an effort to avoid having to apply this negative characteristic to themselves. Perceiving the 
in-group as more variable when it is low in morality may thus allow individuals to protect 
their personal virtue by distancing themselves from an in-group that possesses a negative 
characteristic (e.g., Leach et al., 2006; for a discussion, see Doosje et al., 1999). 
As competence should not be as important as morality in positive in-group evaluation, 
the in-group’s competence should have less of an impact on group pride and perceived group 
variability when the in-group’s morality is also known. Although prior research shows that 
informing individuals about their in-group’s competence alone can affect a range of 
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outcomes, we expect that when information about both competence and morality is provided, 
morality will be more important than competence to in-group membership. To examine these 
hypotheses, we orthogonally manipulated the competence and morality of a pre-existing in-
group and examined its effect on individual’s pride in, and perceived variability of, this in-
group. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 62 female and 34 male students at Leiden University participated (Mage = 20, SD = 
2.77) in exchange for 2 Euros (approx. $3). The experiment took approximately ten minutes 
to complete and was part of a longer session that included a number of different studies. 
At the beginning of the study we assessed identification with the pre-existing in-group 
with four items (similar to the items used in Study 4, e.g. “I identify with [this] University”, 
α = .75, adapted from Ellemers et al., 1999). Identification with the in-group has been shown 
to correlate with pride in (for a review, see Ashmore et al., 2004), and the perceived 
variability of, the in-group (for a review, Doosje et al., 1999). Thus, we wanted to account for 
the effect of group identification to show that the experimental manipulations in this study 
have independent effects on the dependent measures. In addition, we sought to corroborate 
Study 2b by showing that identification with a pre-existing in-group predicts the morality, but 
not the competence and sociability, ascribed to the in-group. 
In a 2x2 factorial design, we orthogonally manipulated the competence (high or low) 
and morality (high or low) of participants’ university in-group. Thus, we told participants that 
a recent investigation conducted by the Ministry of Education had revealed some striking 
differences between students at Dutch universities in terms of their academic results and their 
moral behaviour. More specifically, participants were told that students from their university 
had better (or worse) course grades, and submitted higher (or lower) quality papers and theses 
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than students at other universities. This constituted a manipulation of the in-group’s 
competence as high (or low). The in-group’s morality was manipulated by telling participants 
that the ministry’s investigation found that more (or less) cases of fraud had been revealed, 
and the incidence of plagiarism was higher (or lower) among students at participant’s 
university than at others. After these manipulations, checks and dependent measures were 
assessed. Except when indicated otherwise, all items were presented with seven-point 
response scales that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Measures 
Manipulation Checks. Perceived credibility of the experimental manipulation was 
assessed with three separate items: “I think it is not so easy to interpret the results of this 
study correctly”, “The Ministry of Education has little knowledge about the performance of 
students”, and “This investigation of the Ministry of Education has yielded a number of 
important facts about students”.   
Two questions assessed whether our manipulations had the intended effects. To check 
the manipulation of in-group competence, participants were asked to estimate the “academic 
competence” of students at their university. To check the manipulation of in-group morality, 
participants were asked to estimate the “moral attitude” of students at their university. For 
these two questions responses were given on a scale that ranged from 1 (very negative) to 7 
(very positive). 
Dependent Measures. After the manipulation checks, dependent measures assessed 
the consequences of in-group morality and competence on the positive evaluation of the in-
group. Group pride was assessed with two items (α = .68). Students were asked to indicate 
whether they thought that students at their university had “much to be proud of,” and whether 
they were “proud to be a student at” their university (M = 4.57, SD = 1.17). Next, perceived 
in-group variability was assessed with a single item asking participants to indicate the extent 
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to which they thought students at their university “differ from each other” (M = 4.21, SD = 
1.44).  
Results 
All dependent variables were analyzed using a 2 (Competence: High or Low) by 2 
(Morality: High or Low) ANCOVA, in which pre-existing identification with the in-group 
was included as a covariate. Preliminary analyses confirmed that in-group identification did 
not moderate the effects of our experimental manipulations on any of the checks or 
dependent measures. 
Manipulation checks 
The perceived credibility of the ostensible ministry report was not affected by in-
group identification or the manipulations of in-group morality or competence. The absence of 
main or interaction effects (all Fs < 1, ps > .10) showed that the manipulations were 
considered equally credible in all conditions (“not easy to interpret” -- M = 5.43, SD =1.14, 
“little knowledge”-- M = 5.26, SD = 1.28, and “important facts”-- M = 4.02, SD = 1.31). 
In-group identification did not affect participant’s estimate of in-group competence (F 
< 1, p > .10). As intended, however, there was a sizable main effect of the competence 
manipulation on estimated in-group competence, F (1, 91) = 61.97, p < .001, partial η2 = .41, 
Participants in the High Competence condition estimated in-group competence as higher (M 
= 5.21, SD = .95) than did participants in the Low Competence condition (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.03). As intended, the manipulation of in-group competence had no effect on estimated in-
group morality (F < 1, p > .10). 
In-group identification predicted estimated in-group morality, F (1, 91) = 5.52, p = 
.021, partial η2 = .057. Additionally, there was a sizable main effect of manipulated in-group 
morality on estimated in-group morality, F (1, 91) = 102.62, p < .001, partial η2=.53. 
Participants in the High Morality condition (M = 5.32, SD = 1.09) estimated their in-group’s 
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morality as higher than did participants in the Low Morality condition (M = 3.23, SD = .95). 
As intended, the manipulation of in-group morality did not have a reliable effect on estimated 
in-group competence, F (1, 91) = 1.99, p = .16. 
In sum, the manipulation checks revealed that: (a) the manipulations were equally 
credible in both experimental conditions, (b) the manipulations affected estimates of the in-
group’s competence and morality in the intended way, (c) both the competence and morality 
manipulations yielded comparable mean values and effect sizes, and (d) identification with 
the in-group predicted participants’ subsequent estimate of their in-group’s morality but not 
its competence. 
Group Pride 
After accounting for the effect of in-group identification  -- F (1, 91) = 31. 59, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .26, the analysis only yielded a main effect of the manipulation of in-group 
morality, F (1,91) = 3.97, p = .049, partial η2 = .04. Participants reported more pride in their 
in-group when students at their university were high (M = 4.76, SD = 1.18), rather than low 
(M = 4.39, SD = 1.15) in morality. No main effect of in-group competence was obtained, nor 
was there an interaction between the manipulations of in-group morality and competence, F 
(1, 91) < 1, p > .10. 
Perceived In-group Variability 
The analysis of in-group variability showed only a main effect of in-group morality, F 
(1, 91) = 5.34, p = .012, partial η2= .06. Participants perceived their in-group as more 
variable when it was low (M = 4.52, SD = 1.49) rather than high (M = 3.85, SD = 1.29) in 
morality. Neither in-group identification -- F (1, 91) < 1, p > .10, nor in-group competence -- 
F (1, 91) = 1.49, p = .23, had main effects on perceived in-group variability. In addition, in-
group competence did not interact with in-group morality to affect perceived in-group 
variability, F < 1, p > .10. Thus, in-group competence had no effect on the perceived 
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variability of the in-group. 
Discussion 
As predicted, Study 4 showed that participants’ pride in their in-group was affected 
by the in-group’s morality rather than its competence. Although we were able to show that 
the manipulations of in-group competence and morality were both considered equally 
credible and had comparable effects on manipulation checks, only the in-group’s morality 
affected pride in the in-group. Thus, only high in-group morality led participants to evaluate 
themselves, and their group as a whole, more positively. 
The same pattern emerged for the perceived variability of the in-group. When the in-
group was high in morality, participants perceived the group as less variable in an apparent 
attempt to share in this positive group characteristic. However, when the in-group was low in 
morality, participants appeared to distance themselves from their in-group’s negative 
characteristic. In this context, the in-group’s competence did not appear to be important 
enough to participant’s group-level self-concept to have any effects on the perceived 
variability of the group. 
In further support of our argument, we found identification with the in-group to 
predict subsequent estimates of the in-group’s morality, but not its competence. This 
corroborates and extends the findings of Study 2b using a different in-group and a different 
measure of in-group morality. Thus, Study 4 used a different methodological approach to the 
preceding studies to corroborate the view that an in-group’s morality is more important to its 
positive evaluation than is competence. As in the preceding studies, in-group morality proved 
more important than competence despite the fact that the in-group and the context examined 
appear more relevant to competence than to morality. 
Study 5 
Whereas Study 4 compared the effects of in-group morality and competence, in Study 
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5 we compare the effects of in-group morality and sociability by orthogonally manipulating 
these two characteristics. Although Study 5 again focuses on group pride and perceived in-
group variability as dependent measures, we improved these by increasing the number of 
items used to measure each construct. We also made several other improvements to our 
dependent measures. 
 Instead of solely relying on the global assessment of group pride used in Study 4, in 
Study 5 we also ask participants to indicate the extent to which they are proud of the in-
group’s morality and sociability. In addition, we expanded our measure of pride to include 
items that indicated its opposite -- the negative self-evaluation of shame. We predict that 
participants will report greater pride in their group when it is high in morality. In contrast, we 
expect the sociability of the in-group to have little effect on group-based pride. 
In Study 4, we measured perceived in-group variability to assess the degree to which 
individuals perceived themselves and other in-group members as close or distant from their 
in-group. However, this measure was a quite indirect way of getting at this process and did 
not explicitly refer to the participants themselves. In the present study, we wanted to more 
directly assess the degree to which participants perceived themselves as part of an in-group 
high or low in morality (or sociability). Thus, we included items that asked individuals to 
what degree they perceived themselves as similar to their in-group as a whole. When the in-
group is high in morality, individuals should perceive themselves as more similar to the 
group in an effort to gain a positive self-evaluation from sharing this positive group 
characteristic (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When the in-group is low in morality, individuals 
should perceive themselves as less similar to the in-group in an attempt to distance 
themselves from a negative characteristic that threatens their self-evaluation (see Doosje et 
al., 1999). Because we expect that the in-group’s morality is most important to positive self-
evaluation at the group level, perceived similarity to the in-group should be more affected by 
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our manipulation of in-group morality than sociability. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 27 female and 60 male students at Leiden University participated (Mage = 22, SD = 
2.83) in exchange for 2 Euros (approx. $3). The experiment took about 10 minutes to 
complete and was part of a longer session that included a number of different studies.  
At the beginning of the study we assessed identification with the in-group with the 
same four items used in Study 4 (α = .88). As in Study 4, we controlled for in-group 
identification when examining the effects of our experimental manipulations on the 
dependent variables, and tested whether in-group identification affected participants’ 
estimates of the group’s morality and sociability. 
In a 2x2 experimental design, we manipulated the sociability (high or low) and 
morality (high or low) of participant’s university in-group. As in Study 4, participants were 
instructed that a recent investigation conducted by the Ministry of Education had revealed 
some striking differences between students at universities in the Netherlands. In the present 
study, the investigation revealed differences in student’s social behaviour and their moral 
behaviour. To manipulate in-group sociability, participants were told that students from their 
university were more (or less) friendly than students at other universities, and their 
interactions with others were more (or less) warm than at other universities (cf. Judd et al., 
2005). The in-group’s morality was manipulated with the same instructions as Study 4. After 
these manipulations, the checks and dependent measures were assessed. 
Measures 
Manipulation Checks. Perceived credibility of the experimental manipulations was 
assessed with the same three items used in Study 4. And, as in Study 4, two questions 
assessed whether our experimental manipulations had the intended effect on participants’ 
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estimates of their in-group’s morality and sociability. To check the manipulation of in-group 
sociability, participants were asked to estimate the “social behavior” of students at their 
university. The estimated morality of the in-group was assessed with the same item used in 
Study 4. 
Dependent Measures. After completion of the manipulation checks, dependent 
measures assessed the consequences of in-group morality and sociability for positive 
evaluation of the in-group. This time, group pride was assessed with six items (α = .68, M = 
4.94, SD = .86). Two items asked students to indicate the extent to which they were generally 
“proud” or “ashamed” (reversed) to be a student “at [this university].” Two more specific 
items asked participants how much pride or shame (reversed) they felt about the social 
behavior of students at their university whereas two other items asked participants how much 
pride or shame (reversed) they felt about the moral behavior of students at their university. 
The degree to which participants perceived themselves as similar to their in-group 
was assessed with three items adapted from Doosje et al. (1999) and Ellemers et al. (1999): “I 
am similar to other students at…”, “I am like other students at…”, “I see myself as a student 
at…” (α = .86, M = 4.10, SD = 1.42). Importantly, all three items focused on the individual 
self and its similarity to the in-group, rather than on the variability within the group as a 
whole. 
Results 
All dependent variables were analyzed using a 2 (Sociability: High or Low) by 2 
(Morality: High or Low) ANCOVA, with pre-existing in-group identification treated as a 
covariate. Preliminary analyses confirmed that in-group identification did not moderate the 
effects of our experimental manipulations on any of the checks or dependent measures. 
Manipulation checks 
As in Study 4, perceived credibility of the ostensible ministry report designed to 
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manipulate the in-group’s characteristics was not affected by identification with the in-group 
or the manipulations of in-group morality or sociability. The total absence of reliable main or 
interaction effects (all Fs < 1, ps > .10) showed that the experimental manipulations were 
considered equally credible in all conditions (“not easy to interpret” -- M = 5.38, SD =1.06, 
“little knowledge” -- M = 4.55, SD = 1.40, and “important facts” -- M = 3.63, SD = 1.19). 
Identification with the in-group did not affect estimates of the in-group’s sociability 
(F < 1, p > .10). However, there was a sizable, and statistically reliable, main effect of the 
sociability manipulation on estimated in-group sociability, F (1, 81) = 32.17, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .28. Participants in the High Sociability condition estimated the in-group to be more 
sociable (M = 5.67, SD = .81) than participants in the Low Sociability condition (M = 4.30, 
SD = 1.34). As intended, the manipulation of in-group sociability did not affect estimated in-
group morality (F < 1, p > .10). 
Identification with the in-group marginally predicted the estimated morality of the in-
group, F (1, 81) =3.38, p = .07, partial η2 = .04. Additionally, there was a sizable main effect 
of in-group morality on participants’ estimate of their in-group’s morality, F (1, 81) = 37.43, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .32. Participants in the High Morality condition estimated their in-group 
as more moral (M = 5.45, SD = 1.19) than did participants in the Low Morality condition (M 
= 3.76, SD = 1.37). As intended, the manipulation of in-group morality had no effect on 
estimated in-group sociability (F < 1, p > .10). 
Thus, parallel to the results of Study 4, the manipulation checks revealed that: (a) the 
manipulations were equally credible in all experimental conditions, (b) the manipulations 
affected estimated in-group sociability and morality in the intended way, (c) both the 
competence manipulation and the morality manipulation yielded comparable mean values 
and effect sizes, and (d) identification with the in-group predicted subsequent estimates of the 
in-group’s morality but not its sociability. 
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Group Pride 
After accounting for the effect of in-group identification, F (1, 82) = 38. 86, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .32, only the manipulation of in-group morality yielded a main effect on group 
pride, F (1, 82) = 7.21, p = .009, partial η2 = .08. Participants reported greater pride when 
their in-group was high (M = 5.16, SD = .80), rather than low (M = 4.73, SD = .86) in 
morality. No main effect of in-group sociability was obtained, nor was there an interaction 
between in-group morality and sociability (F < 1, p > .10). 
Perceived similarity to the in-group 
After accounting for the effect of in-group identification -- F (1, 83) = 289.13, p < 
.0001, partial η2 = .77, only the manipulation of in-group morality yielded a main effect on 
perceived similarity to the in-group, F (1, 83) = 6.66, p = .012, partial η2 = .07. As predicted, 
participants perceived themselves as more similar to the in-group when it was high  (M = 
4.34, SD = 1.37), rather than low (M = 3.85, SD = 1.44) in morality. In-group sociability had 
no main effect on perceived similarity to the in-group (F < 1, p > .10), and the interaction 
between in-group sociability and in-group morality was not statistically reliable, F (1, 83) = 
2.53, p = .12. 
Discussion 
With a methodology parallel to that used to compare the effects of in-group morality 
and competence in Study 4, Study 5 compared the effects of in-group morality and 
sociability. As predicted, Study 5 showed that participants’ pride in, and perceived similarity 
to, their in-group was affected by a manipulation of the in-group’s morality, but not its 
sociability. Although we were able to show that the manipulations of in-group sociability and 
morality were equally credible and had comparable effects on manipulation checks, only the 
in-group’s morality had effects. Thus, when information regarding the in-group’s morality 
was presented, the in-group’s sociability had no effect on participant’s pride in, and perceived 
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similarity to, their in-group. In contrast, in-group morality increased participant’s pride and 
perceived similarity. Further support for the central importance of morality was shown in the 
effects of participant’s identification with their in-group. In line with the results of Study 2b 
and Study 4, Study 5 showed in-group identification to uniquely predict participant’s 
subsequent estimate of their in-group’s morality. However, in-group identification did not 
predict estimates of the in-group’s sociability. 
General Discussion 
 Although a great deal of work on stereotypes has examined the degree to which 
individuals ascribe the characteristics of competence and sociability to groups, no previous 
work of which we aware had examined these characteristics in conjunction with morality. 
Where the perception of individual (Wojciszke et al., 1998) or group (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002; 
Kay & Jost, 2003; Phallet & Poppe, 1997) morality had been examined, it conflated traits that 
indicate morality (i.e., honest, sincere, trustworthy) with those indicating sociability (i.e., 
friendly, warm, likeable, kind) or other characteristics. This meant that it was important for 
us to first show that traits designed to indicate morality, competence, and sociability 
constituted distinct group characteristics. In three studies we found consistent evidence for 
this. These measures enabled us to examine the empirical importance of morality, 
competence, and sociability in individuals’ positive evaluation of their in-groups. 
We showed that morality is more important to individuals’ positive evaluation of their 
in-group than is competence or sociability in five different ways. First, Study 1 showed 
individuals to state explicitly that their in-group’s morality is more important than its 
competence or sociability when asked directly. This direct method was complemented by an 
unobtrusive method. 
Thus, in a second approach, three different studies used the common factor model of 
EFA to show that morality was the factor that explained the most variance in positive in-
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group traits. Whether the in-group was pre-existing (Studies 1 and 3) or experimentally-
created (Studies 2a and 2b), morality was most important. Study 3 also showed that morality 
was the most important factor in the positive evaluation of the in-group, irrespective of 
whether the in-group was more or less successful than a relevant out-group. Importantly, the 
EFAs used in the first three studies assessed the empirical importance of morality, 
competence, and sociability. Thus, unlike previous work on competence and sociability, we 
did not infer the importance of these characteristics from the degree to which individuals 
ascribed them to groups. As the ascription of traits to a group may be affected by a number of 
contextual concerns (e.g., Judd et al., 2005; for a discussion, see Spears et al., 2001), we 
thought it better to use EFA to actually assess the importance of morality, competence, and 
sociability in positive evaluation. The EFA approach had the advantage of being an 
unobtrusive assessment of the importance of the group characteristics. When participants 
were asked to ascribe (Studies 2 and 3), or to indicate the importance of (Study 1), positive 
traits to their in-group, they could not anticipate our analysis of common variance in their 
responses. 
Third, we manipulated the characteristics of participants’ in-group to gauge their 
effects on aspects of the group-level self-concept related to positive evaluation. By 
manipulating in-group morality, competence, and sociability, Studies 4 and 5 complemented 
Studies 1-3, which measured these characteristics. Despite this different methodology, both 
Studies 4 and 5 supported the same general conclusion of the first three studies. Whether 
measured or manipulated, in-group morality proved most important to the positive self-
evaluation of the in-group. When manipulations of in-group morality were pitted against 
competence (Study 4) or sociability (Study 5), only in-group morality affected participants 
pride in their in-group and their distancing from it. 
In a fourth approach, we used participants’ pre-existing identification with their in-
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groups as a predictor of in-group morality, competence, and sociability. Identification with 
the in-group led participants to ascribe morality to the in-group (Study 2b) or to estimate the 
in-group as acting more morally (Studies 4 and 5). This pattern was observed whether the in-
group was experimentally created (Study 2b) or pre-existing (Study 4 and 5). Identification 
with the in-group was not a strong predictor of ascribed competence or sociability. 
In a fifth approach, Study 3 had participants ascribe positive traits to a relevant out-
group, as well as to their in-group. Irrespective of relative group success, the morality 
ascribed to this out-group was never of central importance to its positive evaluation. 
Consistent with a functionalist perspective, competence was most important to the positive 
evaluation of a more successful out-group, whereas sociability was most important to the 
positive evaluation of a less successful out-group. Thus, the functionalist thinking that has 
predominated in work on competence and sociability appears to apply better to the evaluation 
of out-groups than to in-groups.  
It is important to note that the participants we used, the group memberships we 
examined, and the contexts of the studies themselves were unlikely to make morality 
important. Indeed, there is good reason to expect that university students are among the least 
concerned with morality (e.g., Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), especially in contexts where their 
university in-group or academic competence is made salient. Thus, in all five of the studies 
reported here, morality was less relevant to group membership than competence or 
sociability. With participants less concerned with competence and sociability, and in contexts 
more relevant to morality, there is good reason to expect that morality would be even more 
important to group membership than was shown here. In any case, our consistent finding that 
morality is of greater importance than competence or sociability in the positive evaluation of 
in-groups raises a number of implications for existing social psychological approaches to in-
group identity and group evaluation. 
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Implications 
Competence 
Social identity theory argues that individuals compare their in-group to relevant out-
groups in “status-defining” domains in an attempt to evaluate themselves positively (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Although it is rarely made explicit, most work within this tradition appears to 
presume that “status-defining” domains are those related to competence. Thus, it is argued 
that positive evaluation is best achieved through an inter-group comparison that establishes 
an in-group as more successful than an out-group in economic, academic, or other domains 
suggestive of competence (for reviews, see Bettencourt et al., 2001; Ellemers et al., 1999; 
Spears et al., 2001). A functionalist view of stereotypes suggests something similar. It 
suggests that groups who are economically, or otherwise, successful use this as a basis upon 
which they can ascribe competence to themselves (e.g., Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 
2002). This ascribed competence presumably serves to legitimate the in-group’s success and 
solidifies its positive evaluation of itself. Thus, most previous work on group characteristics 
suggests that individuals can identity with, and positively evaluate, an in-group ascribed 
competence with little regard for its morality or sociability (e.g., Blanz et al., 1995; Kay & 
Jost, 2003). 
As described above, most previous research has presumed that the simple ascription 
of competence to an in-group indicates its psychological importance. Thus, the ascription of 
competence to economically successful national, ethnic, and gender in-groups, or 
intellectually successful experimentally-created in-groups, has been taken as evidence of the 
psychological importance of competence to group identity and positive evaluation. Rather 
than presuming that the ascription of traits indicate their importance, we chose to actually 
examine this issue. Although all of our studies were done with university students, who 
highly value competence (e.g., Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), competence was never most 
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important to positive evaluation of their in-groups. In fact, where the in-group was more 
successful than a relevant out-group (in Study 3), competence was much less important in the 
positive evaluation of the in-group than was morality. And, when we used a manipulation to 
establish the in-group as highly competent (in Study 4), this did not increase in-group pride 
(in the presence of information regarding in-group morality). 
Although competence may be “status-defining” for in-groups, it does not appear to 
define group virtue. Indeed, as suggested by Study 3, successful in-groups that ascribe 
competence to themselves may treat their morality as especially important to their positive 
evaluation. As success-based competence may be seen as antithetical to morality (e.g., Judd 
et al., 2005), or as dangerous in the absence of morality (e.g., Alexander et al., 1999; Osgood 
et al., 1957), successful, highly competent in-groups seem especially likely to treat morality 
as most important to their positive evaluation of themselves. In this way, attention to morality 
leads to an important qualification of the functionalist view of success-based competence as 
most important to group membership. 
Sociability 
 As suggested by a functionalist perspective, Study 3 found sociability to be the most 
important factor in in-group member’s positive evaluation of a less successful out-group. 
This is broadly consistent with the view that individuals may use the ascription of sociability 
to legitimate an out-group’s lack of success. However, in contrast to a functionalist 
perspective on in-group evaluation, sociability was least important to the positive evaluation 
of a less successful in-group in Study 3. This contrasts with the functionalist presumption that 
less successful in-groups emphasize their sociability to achieve positive evaluation through 
characteristics other than competence (e.g., Kay & Jost, 2003; Judd et al., 2005). Indeed, our 
consistent finding that sociability was more important than competence in the positive 
evaluation of in-groups suggests against interpreting the ascription of sociability to an in-
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group as a creative strategy designed to combat the negative effects of lesser success. A wide 
variety of research with pre-existing national, gender, and ethnic in-groups shows that 
individuals tend to ascribe both competence and sociability to their in-groups (e.g., Brewer & 
Campbell, 1979; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002). It is indeed a virtue to be nice. 
Morality 
Although individuals did not always ascribe greater morality than competence or 
sociability to their in-group, morality was always most important to the positive evaluation of 
the in-group. In addition, individuals’ identification with their in-group was most predictive 
of ascribing morality, rather than competence or sociability, to the in-group. This consistent 
pattern of results is inconsistent with the notion that individuals evaluate their in-group 
positively on the basis of its morality only as a “creative” attempt to achieve positive 
evaluation by succeeding in “alternative” domains, other than competence (see Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). The present pattern of results also suggest that it is problematic to interpret 
less successful group’s ascription of morality to themselves as an acknowledgment of a 
“negative” group identity or a legitimation of their lesser success (e.g., Blanz et al., 1995; 
Kay & Jost, 2003; Phallet & Poppe, 1999). Even where an in-group was more successful (as 
in Study 3) or high in competence (as in Study 4), in-group morality was most important to 
positive in-group evaluation. As Aristotle, and most metaphysics, argues, morality is the most 
important virtue. 
Morality appeared to be less important to the positive evaluation of out-groups. This 
contrasts with previous thinking. Social identity theory, and other functionalist perspectives 
on stereotypes, suggest that more successful in-groups evaluate less successful out-groups as 
moral as a form of noblesse oblige.3 It is argued that by evaluating a less successful out-group 
as moral, the in-group can evaluate the out-group positively in an “alternative” domain other 
than competence (e.g., Blanz et al., 1995; Judd et al., 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003; Phallet & 
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Poppe, 1999). As such, evaluating a less successful out-group as moral is believed to 
legitimate the in-group’s relative success in a “status-defining” domain suggestive of 
competence. However, as the present studies suggest that morality is most important to in-
group evaluation, it seems unlikely that ascribing high morality to a less successful out-group 
functions to legitimate unequal success. Indeed, in Study 3, morality was relatively 
unimportant to individuals’ positive evaluation of a relevant out-group, irrespective of the 
out-groups level of success relative to the in-group. Given how important morality is to the 
positive evaluation of in-groups, it is not surprising that it is less important to the evaluation 
of out-groups. Regardless of how much morality is ascribed to an out-group, it should have 
relatively little importance in the positive evaluation of this out-group if morality is indeed 
central to in-group membership.  
As group morality appears most important to positive evaluation, groups may 
compete for moral status more than they compete for material status. This is suggested by 
Campbell and colleagues’ large-scale cross-cultural studies of ethnocentrism (Brewer & 
Campbell, 1979; Levine & Campbell, 1972). From the Arctic circle to the Amazon, East 
Africa, and the South Pacific, morality was the only characteristic that in-groups consistently 
ascribed to themselves more than to out-groups. Although some in-groups viewed themselves 
as less competent, sociable, strong, or prestigious than neighboring out-groups, morality was 
the characteristic that appears most important to in-group favoritism. Recognizing the 
importance of morality to in-group membership may be an important first step in 
understanding its importance in inter-group relations.
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Footnotes 
1. Leach (2006) recently reviewed work on the evaluation of groups in the 
stereotyping, prejudice, attitude, and group bias literatures. He built on Osgood et al. (1957) 
and Rosenberg et al. (1968) to suggest an integrative two-dimensional framework. He 
conceptualized the characteristics of competence, strength, prestige, and activity as falling 
along a more general dimension of power, whereas the characteristics of sociability, morality, 
cooperation, and compatibility fall along a more general dimension of benevolence. That 
morality and sociability both fall along the more general dimension of benevolence suggests 
why these two characteristics have often been treated as one in work at both the individual 
(e.g., Wojciszke, 1994) and group (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002; Phallet & Poppe, 1997) level. 
2. A similar problem can be found in research examining person perception. 
Wojciszke (1994) argued that morality is more important to individual’s evaluation of other 
people than it is to evaluation of the self because other people’s morality suggests whether 
they will enable, or thwart, one’s goals. In apparent support of this reasoning, Wojciszke et 
al. (1998, Study 1) reported that participants identified more “morality-related” attributes 
(e.g., sincere, honest, fair, but also good-natured, helpful, and understanding) than 
“competence-related” attributes (e.g., competent, intelligent, knowledgeable, efficient) as 
among those most important for other people to possess. However, interpretation is muddied 
by the fact that the measure of “morality” conflates moral traits (i.e., sincere, honest, fair) 
with sociable traits (i.e., good-natured, helpful, understanding). 
3. A functionalist perspective has been used to argue that morality is the characteristic 
most important to individuals’ positive evaluation of other people (see Wojciszke, 1994). For 
example, Phallet and Poppe (1997) argued that in-group member’s perceptions of out-group 
morality is essential to trust in the out-group’s benevolence in interactions. However, 
previous research has tended to conflate out-group morality with sociability (e.g., Fiske et al., 
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2002; Wojciszke, 1994) or dominance (Phallet and Poppe, 1997). Thus, the role of morality 
is unclear. It is the case, however, that studies which have assessed sociability free of 
morality show it to be very important to the positive evaluation of out-groups (e.g., Conway 
et al., 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). 
4. We performed three parallel ANOVAs with Target Group (in- vs, out-group) as a 
within-participant factor and Relative Group Success as a between participants factor. In-
group morality, competence, and sociability were only affected by a main effect of Target 
Group. Participants ascribed more of all three characteristics to their in-group than to the out-
group: morality -- F (1,118) = 6.96, p = .009, partial η2 = .06; competence -- F (1,118) = 
19.54, p < .001, partial η2 = .14; sociability -- F (1,118) = 10.79, p = .001, partial η2 = .08. 
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Table 1: Correlations between importance given in-group morality, sociability, and 
competence and closely related traits, Study 1. 
 
 
Morality Sociability Competence 
 
 
 
Valence   .38*   .33*   .41* 
Virtuous   .29*   .26*   .24* 
Valuable   .42*   .24*   .35* 
Constructive   .31*   .21*   .38* 
Worthless  -.27*  -.27*  -.15 
 
 
  Correct   .39*   .20   .10 
Good    .42*   .31*   .25* 
Correct   .40*   .20   .24* 
Bad   -.29*  -.15  -.05 
Wrong   -.23*  -.21  -.01 
 
Communality   .08   .52*   .10 
 Benevolent  -.12   .31*  -.12 
 Kind    .16   .59*  -.01 
 Helpful   .35*   .41*   .29* 
 Safe    .27*   .32*   .15 
 
Achievement  -.16  -.10   .44* 
Superior  -.20  -.21   .27* 
Successful   .06  -.07   .37* 
 Prestigious  -.07  -.07   .36* 
 Ambitious   .01  -.01   .30* 
Note: Underlined numbers are inter-scale correlations with the other characteristics partialled.
The importance of in-group morality     55 
Table 2: Item loadings from Principal-Axis Factor Analyses with Oblimin rotation, Study 3. 
 
    Morality  Sociability  Competence 
    In > In <  In > In <  In > In < 
 
 
In-group 
 
honest   .885 .973  -.084  .227  -.119 -.187 
sincere    .676 .490  -.251 -.228   .107  .502 
trustworthy   .938 .546   .095  .110   .032  .265 
 
likeable   .234  .099   -.630  .613   .186  .262 
friendly   .338  .048  -.450  .428   .247  .502 
warm    .001  .114  -.771  .608  -.088  .008 
 
intelligent  -.049 -.066  -.009  .072   .667 .900 
competent  -.068  .001  -.138  .172   .697 .598 
skilled    .218  .025   .274 -.024   .650 .797 
 
 variance (%)  41.46 30.05  12.36 6.48   9.33 28.42 
 
 
Out-group 
 
honest  -.717 -.548   .046  .585  -.006 -.088 
sincere   -.820 -.713   .003  .037  -.115  .414 
trustworthy  -.711 -.046   .068  .894   .096 -.094 
 
likeable   .157 -.104    .793  .458  -.249  .223 
friendly  -.265 -.036   .648  .516  <.001  .111 
warm   -.116  .084   .629  .251   .008  .084 
 
intelligent   .066 -.023   .147  .080  -.723 .825 
competent   .031 -.206   .222 -.017  -.620 .653 
skilled   -.217  .131  -.316  .133  -.790 .806 
 
 variance (%)  14.74 7.87  29.59 6.28  13.88  44.80 
 
 
Note: In > : In-group more successful than out-group ; In < : In-group less successful than 
out-group 
